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Abstract—Machine learning models are susceptible to adversarial perturbations: small changes to input that can cause large changes
in output. It is also demonstrated that there exist input-agnostic perturbations, called universal adversarial perturbations, which can
change the inference of target model on most of the data samples. However, existing methods to craft universal perturbations are (i)
task specific, (ii) require samples from the training data distribution, and (iii) perform complex optimizations. Additionally, because of the
data dependence, fooling ability of the crafted perturbations is proportional to the available training data. In this paper, we present a
novel, generalizable and data-free approaches for crafting universal adversarial perturbations. Independent of the underlying task, our
objective achieves fooling via corrupting the extracted features at multiple layers. Therefore, the proposed objective is generalizable to
craft image-agnostic perturbations across multiple vision tasks such as object recognition, semantic segmentation, and depth
estimation. In the practical setting of black-box attack scenario (when the attacker does not have access to the target model and it’s
training data), we show that our objective outperforms the data dependent objectives to fool the learned models. Further, via exploiting
simple priors related to the data distribution, our objective remarkably boosts the fooling ability of the crafted perturbations. Significant
fooling rates achieved by our objective emphasize that the current deep learning models are now at an increased risk, since our
objective generalizes across multiple tasks without the requirement of training data for crafting the perturbations. To encourage
reproducible research, we have released the codes for our proposed algorithm†.
Index Terms—Adversarial perturbations, fooling CNNs, stability of Neural Networks, perturbations, universal, generalizable attacks,
attacks on ML systems, data-free objectives, adversarial noise.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
SMALL but structured perturbations to the input, calledadversarial perturbations, are shown ( [1], [2], [3]) to
significantly affect the output of machine learning systems.
Neural network based models, despite their excellent per-
formance, are observed ( [4], [5], [6]) to be vulnerable to
adversarial attacks. Particularly, Deep Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN) based vision models ( [7], [8], [9], [10], [11])
can be fooled by carefully crafted quasi-imperceptible per-
turbations. Multiple hypotheses attempt to explain the exis-
tence of adversarial samples, viz. linearity of the models [5],
finite training data [12], etc. More importantly, the adver-
sarial perturbations generalize across multiple models. That
is, the perturbations crafted for one model fools another
model even if the second model has a different architecture
or is trained on a different dataset ( [4], [5]). This property
of adversarial perturbations enables potential intruders to
launch attacks without the knowledge about the target
model under attack: an attack typically known as black-box
attack [13]. In contrast, an attack where everything about
the target model is known to the attacker is called a white-
box attack. Until recently, all the existing works assumed
a threat model in which the adversaries can directly feed
input to the machine learning system. However, Kurakin et
al. [14] lately showed that the adversarial samples can re-
• The authors are with the Video Analytics Lab, Department of
Computational and Data Sciences, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore,
India, 560012.
E-mail: kondamopuri@iisc.ac.in, adityaganeshan@gmail.com and
venky@iisc.ac.in
* denotes equal contribution
† https://github.com/val-iisc/gd-uap
main misclassified even if they were constructed in physical
world and observed through a sensor (e.g., camera). Given
that the models are vulnerable even outside the laboratory
setup [14], the models’ susceptibility poses serious threat to
their deploy-ability in the real world (e.g., safety concerns
for autonomous driving). Particularly, in case of critical
applications that involve safety and security, reliable models
need to be deployed to stand against the strong adversarial
attacks. Thus, the effect of these structured perturbations has
to be studied thoroughly in order to develop dependable
machine learning systems.
Recent work by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8] presented the
existence of image-agnostic perturbations, called universal
adversarial perturbations (UAP) that can fool the state-of-
the-art recognition models on most natural images. Their
method for crafting the UAPs, based on the DeepFool [7]
attacking method, involves solving a complex optimization
problem (eqn. 2) to design a perturbation. The UAP [8] pro-
cedure utilizes a set of training images to iteratively update
the universal perturbation with an objective of changing
the predicted label upon addition. Similar to [8], Metzen et
al. [11] proposed UAP for semantic segmentation task. They
extended the iterative FGSM [5] attack by Kurakin et al. [14]
to change the label predicted at each pixel. Additionally,
they craft image-agnostic perturbations to fool the system
in order to predict a pre-determined target segmentation
output.
However, these approaches to craft UAPs ( [8], [11], [15])
have the following important drawbacks:
• Data dependency: It is observed that the objective
presented by [8] to craft UAP requires a minimum
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2number of training samples for it to converge and
craft an image-agnostic perturbation. Moreover, the
fooling performance of the resulting perturbation is
proportional to the available training data (Figure 8).
Similarly, the objective for semantic segmentation
models (e.g., [11]) also requires data. Therefore, ex-
isting procedures can not craft perturbations when
enough data is not provided.
• Weaker black-box performance: Since information about
the target models is generally not available for at-
tackers, it is practical to study the black-box attacks.
Also, black-box attacks reveal the true susceptibility
of the models, while white-box attacks provide an
upper bound on the achievable fooling. However, the
black-box attack of UAP [8] is significantly weaker
than their white-box attack (Table 8). Note that, in [8],
authors have not analyzed the performance of their
perturbations in the black-box attack scenario. They
have assumed that the training data of the target
models is known and have not considered the case in
which adversary has access to only a different set of
data. This amounts to performing only semi white-box
attacks. Black-box attacks generally imply ( [13]) that
the adversary does not have access to (i) the target
network architecture (including the parameters), and
(ii) a large training dataset. Even in the case of
semantic segmentation, since [11] work with targeted
attacks, they observed that the perturbations do not
generalize to other models very well.
• Task specificity: The current objectives to craft UAPs
are task specific. The objectives are typically de-
signed to suit the underlying task at hand since
the concept of fooling varies across the tasks. Par-
ticularly, for regression tasks such as depth esti-
mation and crowd counting, extending the existing
approaches to craft UAPs is non-trivial.
In order to address the above shortcomings and to better
analyze the stability of the models, we present a novel data-
free objective to craft universal adversarial perturbations,
called GD-UAP. Our objective is to craft image-agnostic
perturbations that can fool the target model without any
knowledge about the data distribution, such as, the number
of categories, type of data (e.g., faces, objects, scenes, etc.)
or the data samples themselves. Since we do not want to
utilize any data samples, instead of an objective that reduces
the confidence to the predicted label or flip the predicted
label (as in [4], [7], [8], [11]), we propose an objective to
learn perturbations that can adulterate the features extracted
by the models. Our proposed objective attempts to over-
fire the neurons at multiple layers in order to deteriorate
the extracted features. During the inference time, the added
perturbation misfires the neuron activations in order to con-
taminate the representations and eventually lead to wrong
prediction.
This work extends our earlier conference paper [9]. We
make the following new contributions in this paper:
1) We propose a novel data-free objective for crafting
image-agnostic perturbations.
2) We demonstrate that our objective is generalizable
across multiple vision tasks by extensive evaluation
of the crafted perturbations across three different
vision tasks covering both classification and regres-
sion.
3) Further, we show that apart from being data-free
objective, the proposed method can exploit minimal
prior information about the training data distribu-
tion of the target models in order to craft stronger
perturbations.
4) We present comprehensive analysis of the proposed
objective which includes: (a) a thorough comparison
of our approach with the data-dependant counter-
parts, and (b) evaluation of the strength of UAPs in
the presence of various defense mechanisms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section
2 presents detailed account of related works, section 3
discusses the proposed data-free objective to craft image-
agnostic adversarial perturbations, section 4 demonstrates
the effectiveness of GD-UAP to craft UAPs across various
tasks, section 5 hosts a thorough experimental analysis of
GD-UAP and finally section 6 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORKS
Szegedy et al. [4] demonstrated that despite their superior
recognition performance, neural networks are susceptible
to adversarial perturbations. Subsequently, multiple other
works [5], [6], [7], [16], [17], [18], [19] studied this interesting
and surprising property of the machine learning models.
Though it is first observed with recognition models, the
adversarial behaviour is noticed with models trained on
other tasks such as semantic segmentation [11], [20], object
detection [20], pose estimation [21] and deep reinforcement
learning tasks [22]. There exist multiple methods to craft
these malicious perturbations for a given data sample. For
recognition tasks, they range from performing simple gra-
dient ascent [5] on cost function to solving complex opti-
mizations ( [4], [7], [23] ). Simple and fast methods such as
FGSM [5] find the gradient of loss function to determine the
adversarial perturbation. An iterative version of this attack
presented in [14] achieves better fooling via performing the
gradient ascent multiple times. On the other hand, complex
approaches such as [7] and [4] find minimal perturbation
that can move the input across the learned classification
boundary in order to flip the predicted label. More robust
adversarial attacks have been proposed recently that trans-
fer to real world [14] and are invariant to general image
transformations [24].
Moreover, it is observed that the perturbations exhibit
transferability, that is, perturbations crafted for one model
can fool other models with different architectures and differ-
ent training sets as well ( [4], [5]). Further, Papernot et al. [13]
introduced a practical attacking setup via model distillation
to understand the black-box attack. Black-box attack assumes
no information about the target model and its training data.
They proposed to use a target model’s substitute to craft the
perturbations.
The common underlying aspect of all these techniques is
that they are intrinsically data dependent. The perturbation
is crafted for a given data sample independently of others.
However, recent works by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [8] and
Metzen et al. [11] showed the existence of input-agnostic
3Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed generalized objective to craft “Image
agnostic” (Universal) Adversarial Perturbations for a given target CNN.
Input to our method is a task specific target CNN. The proposed ob-
jective, which is independent of the underlying task, then crafts UAPs
without utilizing any data samples. The crafted UAPs are transferable to
other models trained to perform the same underlying task as the target
CNN.
perturbations that can fool the models over multiple images.
In [8], authors proposed an iterative procedure based on
Deepfool attacking [7] method to craft a universal per-
turbation to fool classification models. Similarly, in [11],
authors craft universal perturbations that can affect target
segmentation output. However, both these works optimize
for different task specific objectives. Also, they require train-
ing data to craft the image-agnostic perturbations. Unlike
the existing works, our proposed method GD-UAP presents
a data-free objective that can craft perturbations without the
need for any data samples. Additionally, we introduce a
generic notion of fooling across multiple computer vision
tasks via over-firing the neuron activations. Particularly, our
objective is generalizable across various vision models in
spite of differences in terms of architectures, regularizers,
underlying tasks, etc.
3 PROPOSED APPROACH
First, we introduce the notation followed throughout the
paper. X denotes the distribution of images in Rd. f denotes
the function learned by the CNN that maps an input image
x ∼ X to its output f(x). δ denotes the image-agnostic
perturbation learned by our objective. Similar to input x,
δ also belongs to Rd. Though the proposed objective is
task independent, for ease of understanding we explain the
proposed approach in the context of object recognition. Note
that the proposed objective is generalizable across multiple
vision tasks to craft task specific, image-agnostic adversar-
ial perturbations. Insterestingly, these crafted task specific
perturbations exhibit cross model generalizability. Figure 1
presents the proposed generalizable approach to learn task
specific, image agnostic perturbations in data-free scenario.
3.1 Data-free objective for fooling
The objective of our paper is to craft an image-agnostic
perturbation δ ∈ Rd that fools the CNN f for images from
the target distribution X without utilizing any samples from
it. That is, we synthesize a δ such that
f(x+ δ) 6= f(x), for x ∼ X . (1)
The pixel intensities of δ are restricted by an impercep-
tibility constraint. Typically, it is realized as a max-norm
constraint in terms of l 8 or l2 norms (e.g. [5], [8], [9], [11]).
In this paper, for all our analysis we impose l 8 norm. Thus,
the aim is to find a δ such that
f(x+ δ) 6= f(x), for x ∈ X ;
‖ δ ‖ 8 < ξ. (2)
However, the focus of the proposed work is to craft δ
without requiring any data samples. The data-free nature
of our approach prohibits us from utilizing eqn. 2 for
learning δ, as we do not have access to data x. Therefore,
we instead propose to fool the CNN by contaminating the
extracted representations of the input at multiple layers of
the architecture. In other words, as opposed to the typical
“flipping the label” objective, we attempt to “over-fire” the
features extracted at multiple layers. That is, we craft a
perturbation δ such that it leads to additional activation
firing at each layer and thereby misleading the features
(filters) at the following layer. The accumulated effect of the
contamination eventually leads the CNN to misclassify.
The perturbation essentially causes filters at a particular
layer to spuriously fire and extract inefficacious information.
Note that in the presence of data (during attack), in order to
mislead the activations from retaining useful discriminative
information, the perturbation (δ) has to be highly effective.
Also, the imperceptibility constraint (second part of eqn. 2)
on δ makes it more challenging.
Hence without utilizing any data x, we seek an image-
agnostic perturbation δ that can produce maximal spurious
activations at each layer of a given CNN. In order to craft
such a δ we start with a random perturbation and optimize
for the following objective:
Loss = − log
(
K∏
i=1
‖li(δ)‖2
)
, such that ‖ δ ‖ 8 < ξ.
(3)
where li(δ) is the activation in the output tensor (after
the non-linearity) at layer i when δ is fed to the network f .
K is the number of layers in f at which we maximize the
activations caused by δ, and ξ is the max-norm limit on δ.
The proposed objective computes product of activation
magnitude at all the individual layers. We observed product
resulting in stronger δ than other forms of aggregation (e.g.
sum). To avoid working with extreme values (≈ 0), we
apply log on the product. Note that the objective is open-
ended as there is no optimum value to reach. We would
ideally want δ to cause as much strong disturbance at all
the layers as possible, within the imperceptibility constraint.
More discussion on the motivation and working of the
proposed objective is presented in Section 5.
3.2 Implementation Details
We begin with a target network f which is a trained CNN
whose parameters are frozen and a random perturbation
δ. We then perform the proposed optimization to update
δ for causing strong activations at multiple layers in the
given network. Typically, it is considered that the convo-
lution (conv) layers learn information-extracting features
which are then classifed by a series of fc layers. Hence, we
4optimize our objective only at all the conv layers. This was
empirically found to be more effective than optimizing at
all layers as well. In case of advanced architectures such
as GoogLeNet [25] and ResNet [26], we optimize at the
last layers of all the inception (or residual) blocks and the
independent conv layers. We observed that optimizing at
these layers results in δ with a fooling capacity similar to
the one resulting from optimizing at all the intermediate
layers as well (including the conv layers within the incep-
tion/residual blocks). However, since optimizing at only the
last layers of these blocks is more efficient, we perform the
same.
Note that the optimization updates only the perturbation
δ, not the network parameters. Additionally, no image data
is involved in the optimization. We update δ with the
gradients computed for loss in eqn. (3) iteratively till the
fooling performance of the learned δ gets saturated on a
set of validation images. In order to validate the fooling
performance of the learned δ, we compose an unrelated
substitute dataset (D). Since our objective is not to utilize
data samples from the training dataset, we randomly select
1, 000 images from a substitute dataset to serve as validation
images. It is a reasonable assumption for an attacker to have
access to 1, 000 unrelated images. For crafting perturbations
to object recognition models trained on ILSVRC dataset [27],
we choose random samples from Pascal VOC-2012 [28]
dataset. Similarly, for semantic segmentation models trained
on Pascal VOC [28], [29], we choose validation samples from
ILSVRC [27], for depth estimation models trained on KITTI
dataset [30] we choose samples from Places-205 [31] dataset.
3.3 Exploiting additional priors
Though GD-UAP is a data-free optimization for crafting
image-agnostic perturbations, it can exploit simple addi-
tional priors about the data distribution X . In this section
we demonstrate how GD-UAP can utilize simple priors such
as (i) mean value and dynamic range of the input, and (ii)
target data samples.
3.3.1 Mean and dynamic range of the input
Note that the proposed optimization (eqn. (3)) does not con-
sider any information about X . We present only the norm
limited δ as input and maximize the resulting activations.
Hence, during the optimization, input to the target CNN
has a dynamic range of [−ξ, ξ] (ξ = 10). However, during
the inference time, input lies in [0, 255] range. Therefore,
it becomes very challenging to learn perturbations that can
affect the neuron activations in the presence of strong (an
order higher) input signal x. Hence, in order to make the
learning easier, we may provide this useful information
about the data (x ∈ X ), and let the optimization better
explore the space of perturbations. Thus, we slightly modify
our objective to craft δ relative to the dynamic range of the
data. We create pseudo data d via randomly sampling from a
Gaussian distribution whose mean (µ) is equal to the mean
of training data and variance (σ) is such that 99.9% of the
samples lie in [0, 255], the dynamic range of input. Thus, we
solve for the following loss:
Loss = −
∑
d∼N (µ,σ)
log
(
K∏
i=1
‖li(d+ δ)‖2
)
,
such that ‖δ ‖ 8 < ξ.
(4)
Essentially, we operate the proposed optimization in a
subspace closer to the target data distribution X . In other
words, d in eqn. (4) acts as a place holder for the actual
data and helps to learn perturbations which can over-fire
the neuron activations in the presence of the actual data.
A single Gaussian sample with twice the size of the input
image is generated. Then, random crops from the Gaussian
sample, augmented with simple techniques such as random
cropping, blurring, and rotation are used for the optimiza-
tion.
3.3.2 Target data samples
Now, we modify our data-free objective to utilize samples
from the target distribution X and improve the fooling
ability of the crafted perturbations. Note that in the case
of data availability, we can design direct objectives such as
reducing confidence for the predicted label or changing the
predicted label, etc. However, we investigate if our data-
free objective of over-firing the activations, though is not
designed to utilize data, crafts better perturbations when
data is presented to the optimization. Additionally, our
objective does not utilize data to manipulate the predicted
confidences or labels. Rather, the optimization benefits from
prior information about the data distribution such as the
dynamic range, local patterns, etc., which can be provided
through the actual data samples. Therefore, with minimal
data samples we solve for the following optimization prob-
lem
Loss = −
∑
x∼X
log
(
K∏
i=1
‖li(x+ δ)‖2
)
,
such that ‖δ ‖ 8 < ξ.
(5)
Presenting data samples to the optimization procedure is a
natural extension to presenting the dynamic range of the
target data alone (section 3.3.1). In this case, we utilize a
subset of training images on which the target CNN models
are trained (similar to [8], [11]).
3.4 Improved Optimization
In this subsection, we present improvements to the op-
timization process presented in our earlier work [9]. We
observe that the proposed objective quickly accumulates δ
beyond the imposed max-norm constraint (ξ). Because of
the clipping performed after each iteration, the updates after
δ reaches the constraint are futile . To tackle this saturation,
δ is re-scaled to half of its dynamic range (i.e. [−5, 5]).
Not only does the re-scale operation allow an improved
utilization of the gradients, it also retains the pattern learnt
in the optimization process till that iteration.
In our previous work [9], the re-scale operation is done
in a regular time interval of 300 iterations. Though this
re-scaling helps to learn better δ, it is inefficient since it
performs blind re-scaling without verifying the scope for
5updating δ. This is specially harmful later in the learning
process, when the perturbation may not be re-saturated in
300 iterations.
Therefore, we propose an adaptive re-scaling of δ based
on the rate of saturation (reaching the extreme values of
±10) in its pixel values. During the optimization, at each
iteration we compute the proportion (p) of the pixels in
δ that reached the max-norm limit ξ. As the learning pro-
gresses, more number of pixels reach the max-norm limit
and because of the clipping, eventually get saturated at ξ.
Hence, the rate of increase in p decreases as δ saturates. We
compute the rate of saturation, denoted as S, of the pixels
in δ after each iteration during the training. For consecutive
iterations, if increase in p is not significant (less than a pre-
defined threshold θ), we perform a re-scaling to half the
dynamic range. We observe that this adaptive re-scaling
consistently leads to better learning.
3.5 Algorithmic summarization
In this subsection, for the sake of brevity we summarize the
proposed approach in the form of an algorithm. Algorithm 1
presents the proposed optimization as a series of steps. Note
that it is a generic form comprising of all the three variations
including both data-free and with prior versions.
For ease of reference, we repeat some of the notation. Ft
is the fooling rate at iteration t, li(x) is the activation caused
at layer i of the CNN f for an input x, η is the learning rate
used for training, ∆ is the gradient of the loss with respect
to the input δ, St is the rate of saturation of pixels in the
perturbation δ at iteration t, θ is the threshold on the rate of
saturation, Ft is the fooling rate, H is the patience interval
of validation for verifying the convergence of the proposed
optimization.
3.6 Generalized Fooling Rate (GFR)
While the notion of ‘fooling’ has been well defined for the
task of image recognition, for other tasks it is unclear. Hence,
in order to provide an interpretable metric to measure ‘fool-
ing’, we introduce Generalized Fooling Rate (GFR), making
it independent of the task, and dependent on the metric
being used for evaluating the model’s performance.
Let M be a metric for measuring the performance of a
model for any task, where the range of M is [0, R]. Let the
metric take two inputs yˆ and y, where yˆ is the predicted
output and y is the ground truth output, such that the
performance of the model is measured as M(yˆ, y). Let yˆδ be
the output of the model when the input is perturbed with
a perturbation δ. Then, the Generalized Fooling Rate with
respect to measure M is defined as:
GFR(M) =
R−M(yˆδ, yˆ)
R
. (6)
This definition of Generalized Fooling rate (GFR) has the
following benefits:
• GFR is a natural extension of ‘fooling rate’ defined
for image recognition, where the fooling rate can be
written as GFR(Top1) = 1 − Top1(yˆδ, yˆ), where
Top1 is the Top-1 Accuracy metric.
• Fooling rate should be a measure of the change in
model’s output caused by the perturbation. Being
Algorithm 1: Algorithm summarizing our approach
to craft image-agnostic adversarial perturbations via
data-free objective and exploiting various data priors.
Data: Target CNN f , data g. Note that g = 0 for
data-free case, g = d ∼ N (µ, σ) for range prior
case, and g = x for training data samples case.
Result: Image-agnostic adversarial perturbation δ.
1 Randomly initialize δ0 ∼ U [−ξ, ξ]
2 t = 0
3 Ft = 0
4 do
5 t← t+ 1
6 Compute li(g + δ)
7 Compute loss = −∑ log( K∏
i=1
‖li(g + δ)‖2
)
8 Update1 δt : δt ← δt−1 − η∆
9 Compute the rate of saturation St in the δt pixels
10 if St < θ then
11 δt ← δt/2
12 end
13 Compute Ft of δt on substitute dataset D
14 while Ft < min. of {Ft−H , Ft−H+1 . . . Ft−1};
15 j ← argmax. of {Ft−H , Ft−H+1 . . . Ft−1}
16 Return δj
1Note that the generic update equation 8 is only representative and not
the exact equation implemented.
independent of the ground truth y, and dependant
only on yˆδ and yˆ, GFR primarily measures the change
in the output. A poorly performing model which
however is very robust to adversarial attacks will
show very poor GFR values, highlighting its robust-
ness.
• GFR measures the performance of a perturbation in
terms of the damage caused to a model with respect
to a metric. This is an important feature, as tasks such
as depth estimation have multiple performance mea-
sures, where some perturbation might cause harm
only to some of the metrics while leaving other
metrics unaffected.
For all the tasks considered in this work, we report GFR
with respect to a metric as a measure of ‘fooling’.
4 GD-UAP: EFFECTIVENESS ACROSS TASKS
In this section, we present the experimental evaluation to
demonstrate the effectiveness of GD-UAP. We consider three
different vision tasks to demonstrate the generalizability of
our objective, namely, object recognition, semantic segmen-
tation and unsupervised monocular depth estimation. Note
that the set of applications include both classification and
regression tasks. Also, it has both supervised and unsuper-
vised learning setups, and various archtectures such as fully
convolutional networks, and encoder-decoder networks. We
explain each of the tasks separately in the following subsec-
tions.
For all the experiments, the ADAM [32] optimization
algorithm is used with the learning rate of 0.1. The threshold
θ for the rate of saturation S is set to 10−5 and ξ value of
6TABLE 1
Fooling rates for GD-UAP perturbations learned for object recognition
on ILSVRC dataset [27]. Each row of the table shows fooling rates for
perturbation learned on a specific target model when attacking various
other models (columns). These rates are obtained by GD-UAP
objective with range prior (sec. 3.3.1). Diagonal rates indicate
white-box attack scenario and off-diagonal ones represent black-box
attack scenario.
Model CaffeNet VGG-F GoogLeNet VGG-16 VGG-19 Resnet-152
CaffeNet 87.02 65.97 49.40 50.46 49.92 38.57
VGG-F 59.89 91.91 52.24 51.65 50.63 40.72
GoogLeNet 44.70 46.09 71.44 37.95 37.90 34.56
VGG-16 50.05 55.66 46.59 63.08 56.04 36.84
VGG-19 49.11 53.45 40.90 55.73 64.67 35.81
Resnet-152 38.41 37.20 33.22 27.76 26.52 37.3
CaffeNet VGG-F Googlenet VGG-16 VGG-19 ResNet-152
Fig. 2. Universal adversarial perturbations crafted by GD-UAP objective
for multiple models trained on ILSVRC [27] dataset. Perturbations were
crafted with ξ = 10 using the range prior (sec. 3.3.1).Images are best
viewed in color.
10 is used. Validation fooling rate Ft is measured on the
substitute dataset D after every 200 iterations only when
the threshold of the rate of saturation is crossed. If it is not
crossed, Ft is measured after every 400 iterations. Note that
the algorithm specific hyper-parameters are not changed
across tasks or across priors.
For all the following experiments, perturbation crafted
with different priors are denoted as PNP , PRP , andPDP for
the No prior, Range prior, and Data prior scenario respectively.
To emphasize the effectiveness of the proposed objective,
we present fooling rates obtained by a random baseline
perturbation. Since our learned perturbation is norm limited
by ξ, we sample random δ from U [−ξ, ξ] and compute
the fooling rates. In all tables in this section, the ‘Baseline’
column refers to this perturbation.
4.1 Object Recognition
We utilized models trained on ILSVRC [27] and Places-205
[31] datasets, viz. CaffeNet [33], VGG-F [34], Googlenet [25],
VGG-16 [35], VGG-19 [35], ResNet-152 [26]. For all ex-
periments, pretrained models are used whose weights are
kept frozen throughout the optimization process.Also, in
contrast to UAP [8], we do not use training data in the
data-free scenario (sec. 3.1 and sec. 3.3.1). However, as
explained earlier, we use 1, 000 images randomly chosen
from Pascal VOC-2012 [28] training images as validation set
(D in Algorithm 1) for our optimization. Also, in case of
exploiting additional data prior (sec. 3.3.2), we use limited
data from the corresponding training set. For the final
evaluation on ILSVRC of the crafted UAPs, 50, 000 images
from the validation set are used. Similarly, for Places-205
dataset, 20, 500 images from the validation set are used.
4.1.1 Fooling performance of the data-free objective
Table 1 presents the fooling rates achieved by our objec-
tive on various network architectures. Fooling rate is the
Missile Banana Tank Banjo Skunk French loaf
African
chamaelon
Custard
Apple
Half
track Vault
Jigsaw
puzzle
Normal
chiton
Fig. 3. Sample original and adversarial image pairs from ILSVRC vali-
dation set generated for VGG-19. First row shows original images and
corresponding predicted labels, second row shows the corresponding
perturbed images along with their predictions.
percentage of test images for which our crafted perturba-
tion δ successfully changed the predicted label. Using the
terminology introduced in sec. 3.6, fooling rate can also
be written as GFR(Top1). Higher the fooling rate, greater
is the perturbation’s ability to fool and lesser is the the
classifier’s robustness. Fooling rates in Table 1 are obtained
using the mean and dynamic range prior of the training
distribution (sec. 3.3.1). Each row in the table indicates one
target model employed in the learning process and the
columns indicate various models attacked using the learned
perturbations. The diagonal fooling rates indicate the white-
box attacking, where all the information about the model is
known to the attacker. The off-diagonal rates indicate black-
box attacking, where no information about the model under
attack is revealed to the attacker. However, the dataset over
which both the models (target CNN and the CNN under
attack) are trained is same. Our perturbations cause a mean
white-box fooling rate of 69.24% and a mean black-box
fooling rate of 45.13%. Given the data-free nature of the
optimization, these fooling rates are alarmingly significant.
The high fooling rates achieved by the proposed approach
can adversely affect the real-world deploy-ability of these
models.
Figure 2 shows example image-agnostic perturbations
(δ) crafted by the proposed method. Note that the pertur-
bations look very different for each of the target CNNs.
Interestingly, the perturbations corresponding to the VGG
models look similar, which might be due to their architec-
tural similarity. Figure 3 shows sample perturbed images
(x + δ) for VGG-19 [35] from ILSVRC [27] validation set.
The top row shows the clean and bottom row shows the cor-
responding adversarial images. Note that the adversarially
perturbed images are visually indistinguishable form their
corresponding clean images. All the clean images shown in
the figure are correctly classified and are successfully fooled
by the added perturbation. Below each image, correspond-
ing label predicted by the model is shown. Note that the
correct labels are shown in black color and the wrong ones
in red.
4.1.2 Exploiting the minimal prior
In this section, we present experimental results to demon-
strate how our data-free objective can exploit the additional
prior information about the target data distribution as dis-
cussed in section 3.3. Note that we consider two cases: (i)
7providing the mean and dynamic range of the data samples,
denoted as range prior (sec. 3.3.1), and (ii) utilizing minimal
data samples themselves during the optimization, denoted
as data prior ( 3.3.2).
TABLE 2
Fooling rates for the proposed objective with and without utilizing prior
information about the training data. For comparison, we provide the
random baseline, existing data-free [9], and data dependent [8]
objectives.
Model Baseline PNP PRP PDP FFF [9] UAP [8]
CaffeNet 12.9 84.88 87.02 91.54 80.92 93.1
VGG-F 12.62 85.96 91.81 92.64 81.59 93.8
Googlenet 10.29 58.62 71.44 83.54 56.44 78.5
VGG-16 8.62 45.47 63.08 77.77 47.10 77.8
VGG-19 8.40 40.68 64.67 75.51 43.62 80.8
Resnet-152 8.99 29.78 37.3 66.68 - 84.0
Table 2 shows the fooling rates obtained with and with-
out utilizing the prior information. Note that all the fooling
rates are computed for white-box attacking scenario. For
comparison, fooling rates obtained by our previous data-
free objective [9] and a data dependent objective [8] are also
presented. Important observations to draw from the table
are listed below:
• Utilizing the prior information consistently improves
the fooling ability of the crafted perturbations.
• A simple range prior can boost the fooling rates on
an average by an absolute 10%, while still being data-
free.
• Although the proposed objective is not designed to
utilize the data, feeding the data samples results in an
absolute 22% rise in the fooling rates. Due to this in-
crease in performance, for all models (except ResNet-
152) our method becomes comparable or even better
than UAP [8], which is designed especially to utilizes
data.
4.2 Semantic segmentation
In this subsection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of GD-
UAP objective to craft universal adversarial perturbations
for semantic segmentation. We consider four network ar-
chitectures. The first two architectures are from FCN [36]:
FCN-Alex, based on Alexnet [33], and FCN-8s-VGG, based
on the 16-layer VGGNet [35]. The last two architectures are
16-layer VGGNet based DL-VGG [37], and DL-RN101 [38],
which is a multi-scale architecture based on ResNet-101 [26].
The FCN architetures are trained on Pascal VOC-2011
dataset [29], [39], consisting 9, 610 training samples and the
FCN-Alex FCN-8s-VGG DL-VGG DL-RN101
Fig. 4. Universal adversarial perturbations for semantic segmentation,
crafted by the proposed GD-UAP objective for multiple models. Per-
turbations were crafted with “data w/ less BG” prior. Images are best
viewed in color.
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Fig. 5. Sample original and adversarial images from PASCAL-2011
dataset generated for FCN-Alex. First row shows clean and adversarial
images with various priors. Second row shows the corresponding pre-
dicted segmentation maps.
the remaining two architectures are trained on Pascal VOC-
2012 dataset [28], [39], consisting 10, 582 training samples.
However, for testing our perturbation’s performance, we
only use the validation set provided by [36], which consist
of 736 images.
Semantic segmentation is realized as assigning a label to
each of the image pixels. That is, these models are typically
trained to perform pixel level classification into one of
21 categories (including the background) using the cross-
entropy loss. Performance is commonly measured in terms
of mean IOU (intersection over union) computed between
the predicted map and the ground truth. Extending the UAP
generation framework provided in [8] to segmentation is a
non-trivial task. However, our generalizable data-free algo-
rithm can be applied for the task of semantic segmentation
without any changes.
Similar to recognition setup, we present multiple scenar-
ios for crafting the perturbations ranging from no data to
utilizing data samples from the target distribution. An in-
teresting observation with respect to the data samples from
Pascal VOC-2012, is that, in the 10, 582 training samples,
65.4% of the pixels belong to the ‘background’ category.
Due to this, when we craft perturbation using training
data samples as target distribution prior, our optimiza-
tion process encounters roughly 65% pixels belonging to
‘background‘ category, and only 35% pixels belonging to
the rest 20 categories. As a result of this data imbalance,
the perturbation is not sufficiently capable to corrupt the
features of pixels belonging to the categories other than
‘background’. To handle this issue, we curate a smaller set of
2, 833 training samples from Pascal VOC-2012, where each
sample has less than 50% pixels belonging to ‘background’
category. We denote this as “data w/ less BG”, and only
33.5% of pixels in this dataset belong to the ‘background’
category. The perturbations crafted using this dataset as
target distribution prior show a higher capability to corrupt
features of pixels belonging to the rest 20 categories. Since
mean IOU is the average of IOU accross the 21 categories,
we further observe that perturbations crafted using “data
w/ less BG” cause a substantial reduction in the mean IOU
measure as well.
Table 3 shows the generalized fooling rates with respect
to the mean IOU (GFR(mIOU)) obtained by GD-UAP
perturbations under various data priors. As explained in
section 3.6, the generalized fooling rate measures the change
in the performance of a network with respect to a given
metric, which in our case is the mean IOU. Note that,
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Fig. 6. Segmentation predictions of multiple models over a sample
perturbed image. Perturbations were crafted using the “data w/ less BG”
prior. The first row shows the perturbed input image, the second shows
the segmentation output of clean sample image, and the third shows
the segmentation output of the perturbed sample image. Images are
best viewed in color.
TABLE 3
Generalized fooling rates achieved by the perturbations crafted by the
proposed approach under various settings. Note that for comparison,
fooling rates achieved by random perturbations are also presented.
Model Baseline No
Data
Range
Prior
All
Data
Data W/
less BG
FCN-Alex 14.29 80.15 86.57 85.96 89.61
FCN-8s-VGG 9.24 49.42 55.04 61.15 67.19
DL-VGG 10.66 55.90 58.96 44.82 66.68
DL-RN101 8.8 37.06 35.6 58.62 56.61
similar to the recognition case, the fooling performance
monotonically increases with the addition of data priors.
This observation emphasizes that the proposed objective,
though being an indirect, can rightly exploit the additional
prior information about the training data distribution. Also,
for all the models (Other than DL-RN101), “data w/ less
BG” scenario results in the best fooling rate. This can be
attributed to the fact that in “data w/ less BG” scenario
we reduce the data-imbalance which in turn helps to craft
perturbations that fool both background and object pixels.
In Table 4 we present the mean IOU metric obtained
on the perturbed images learned under various scenarios
along with original mean IOU obtained on clean images.
It is clearly observed that the random perturbation (the
baseline) is not effective in fooling the segmentation models.
However, the proposed objective crafts perturbations within
the same range that can significantly fool the models. We
also show the mean IOU obtained by Xie et al. [20], an image
specific adversarial perturbation crafting work. Note that
since GD-UAP is an image-agnostic approach, it is unfair
to expect similar performance as [20]. Further, the mean
IOU shown by [20] for DL-VGG and DL-RN101 models
(bottom 2 rows of Table 4) denote the transfer performance,
i.e., black-box attacking and hence show a smaller drop of
the mean IOU from that of clean images. However, they are
provide as an anchor point for evaluating image-agnostic
TABLE 4
Comparison of mean IOU obtained by various models against GD-UAP
perturbations. Comparison with image specific adversaries [20] is also
presented. ∗ denotes being image-specific and † denotes a transfer
attack (black-box attacking). Being image specific, [20] (ICCV 2017)
outperforms our perturbations, however, even our no data perturbations
cause more drop in mIOU than their transfer perturbations.
Model Original Baseline No
Data
Range
prior
All
data
Data w/
less BG
[20]
FCN-Alex 46.21 45.72 15.35 10.37 10.64 8.03 3.98*
FCN-8s-VGG 65.49 64.34 42.78 39.08 33.61 28.05 4.02*
DL-VGG 62.10 61.13 36.91 35.41 44.90 27.41 43.96∗†
DL-RN101 74.94 73.42 56.40 58.66 37.45 39.00 73.01∗†
perturbations generated using GD-UAP.
Figure 4 shows sample image-agnostic adversarial per-
turbations learned by our objective for semantic segmenta-
tion. In Figure 4, we show the perturbations learned with
“data w/ less BG” prior for all the models. Similar to the
recognition case, these perturbations look different across
architectures. Figures 5 shows example image and predicted
segmentation outputs by FCN-Alex model for perturbations
crafted with various priors. Top row shows the clean and the
perturbed images. Bottom row shows the predictions for the
corresponding inputs. Further, the type of prior utilized to
craft the perturbation is mentioned below the predictions.
Crafted perturbations are clearly successful in misleading
the model to predict inaccurate segmentation maps.
Figure 6 shows the effect of perturbation on multiple
networks. It shows the output maps predicted by various
models for the same input perturbed with corresponding δ
learned with “data w/ less BG” prior. It is interesting to
note from Figure 6 that for the same image, with UAPs
crafted using the same prior, different networks can have
very different outputs, even if their outputs for clean images
are very similar.
4.3 Depth estimation
Recent works such as [40], [41], [42] show an increase in use
of convolutional networks for regression-based computer
vision task. A natural question to ask is whether they are
as susceptible to universal adversarial attacks, as CNNs
used for classification. In this section, by crafting UAPs
for convolutional networks performing regression, we show
that they are equally susceptible to universal adversarial
attacks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to provide an algorithm for crafting universal adversarial
attacks for convolutional networks performing regression,
Many recent works like [40], [43], [44] perform depth
estimation using convolutional network. In [40], the au-
thors introduce Monodepth, an encoder-decoder architec-
ture which regresses the depth of given monocular in-
put image. We craft UAP using GD-UAP algorithm for
the two variants of Monodepth, Monodepth-VGG and
Monodepth-ResNet50. The network is trained using KITTI
dataset [30]. In its raw form, the dataset contains 42, 382
rectified stereo pairs from 61 scenes, with a typical image
being 1242×375 pixels in size. We show results on the eigen
split, introduced in [45], which consist of 23, 488 images for
training and validation, and 697 images for test. We use
9Fig. 7. Sample original and adversarial image pairs from KITTI dataset generated for Monodepth-VGG. First row shows clean and perturbed
images with various priors. Second row shows the corresponding predicted depth maps.
TABLE 5
Performance of the crafted perturbations for Monodepth-Resnet50
and Monodepth-VGG using various metrics for evaluating depth
estimation on the eigen test-split of KITTI datset. Results are also
presented for the clean data (Normal) and the train set mean. The best
fooling results for each scenario are shown in bold. The evaluation of
train-set mean performance has been taken from [40]. Note that the
first four metrics are error based (higher means better fooling) and the
later two are precision based (lower is better fooling).
Metrics Abs Rel Sq Rel RMSE RMSE log δ(1.25) δ(1.253)
Monodepth-ResNet50
Normal 0.133 1.148 5.549 0.230 0.829 0.970
Baseline 0.1339 1.1591 5.576 0.231 0.827 0.969
PNP 0.201 1.810 6.603 0.352 0.688 0.908
PRP 0.319 3.292 9.064 0.640 0.460 0.717
PDP 0.380 10.278 10.976 0.402 0.708 0.900
Train-mean 0.361 4.826 8.102 0.377 0.638 0.894
Monodepth-VGG
Normal 0.148 1.344 5.927 0.247 0.803 0.964
Baseline 0.149 1.353 5.949 0.248 0.800 0.963
PNP 0.192 1.802 6.626 0.325 0.704 0.929
PRP 0.212 2.073 6.994 0.364 0.658 0.906
PDP 0.355 9.612 10.592 0.390 0.714 0.908
Train-mean 0.361 4.826 8.102 0.377 0.638 0.894
the same crop size as suggested by the authors of [45] and
evaluate at the input image resolution.
As in the case of object recognition, UAPs crafted by the
proposed method for monodepth also show the potential to
exploit priors about the data distribution. We consider three
cases, (i) providing no priors (PNP ), (ii)range prior (PRP ),
and (ii) data prior (PDP ). For providing data priors, we
randomly pick 10, 000 image samples from the KITTI train
dataset. To attain complete independence of target data,
we perform validation on a set of 1, 000 randomly picked
images from Places-205 dataset. The optimization procedure
followed is the same as in the case of the previous two task.
Table 5 show the performance of Monodepth-Resnet50
and Monodepth-VGGunder the presence of the various
UAPs crafted by the proposed method. As can be observed
from the table, the crafted UAPs have a strong impact on
the performance of the network. For both the variants of
monodepth, UAPs crafted with range prior, bring down the
accuracy with the threshold of 1.25 units (δ < 1.25) by
25.7% on an average. With data priors, the crafted UAPs
are able to increase the Sq Rel (an error metric) to almost
10 times the original performance. Under the impact of
the crafted UAPs, the network’s performance drops below
that of the depth-baseline (Train-mean), which uses the train
set mean as the prediction for all image pixels. Figure 7
TABLE 6
GFR with respect to δ < 1.25 metric for the task of depth estimation
Model Baseline No
data
Range
prior
Data
prior
Monodepth-VGG 0.4% 15.3% 22.7% 21.3%
Monodepth-Resnet50 2% 21.3% 47.6% 24.3%
shows the input-output pair for Monodepth-VGG, where
the input is perturbed by the various kinds of UAPs crafted.
Table 6 shows the Generalized Fooling Rates (GFR) with
respect δ < 1.25, i.e. GFR(δ < 1.25). It is observed that
PRP has higher GFR(δ < 1.25) than PDP . This may
appear as an anomaly as PDP , which has access to more
information, should cause stronger harm to the network
than PRP . This is indeed reflected in terms of multiple
metrics such as Abs.Rel.Error, and RMSE (ref. Table 5).
In fact, PDP is able to reduce these metrics even below the
values achieved by the train-set mean. This clearly shows
that PDP is indeed stronger than PRP (in terms of these
metrics).
However, in terms of the other metrics, such as δ < 1.25
and δ < 1.253 , it is observed that PRP causes more harm.
These metrics measure the % of pixels where f(x) − G(x)
(where G(x) represents the ground truth depth at x) is
lesser than pre-defined limits. In contrast, metrics such as
Abs.Rel.Error, and RMSE measure the overall error of
the output. Hence, based on the effect of PDP and PRP on
these metrics, we infer that while PDP shifts fewer pixels
than PRP , it severely shifts those pixels. In fact, as shown in
Figure 7, it is often noticed that PDP causes the network to
completely miss some nearby objects, and hence predicting
very high depth at such locations, whereas PRP causes a
anomalous estimation at a higher number of pixels.
The above situation shows that the ‘fooling’ performance
of a perturbation can vary based on the metric used for
analysis. Further, conclusions based on a single metric may
only partially reflect the truth. This motivated us to propose
GFR(m), a metric dependant measurement of ‘fooling’,
which clearly indicates the metric dependence of ‘fooling’.
5 GD-UAP: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide additional analysis of GD-UAP
on various fronts. First, we clearly highlight the multiple
advantages of GD-UAP by comparing it with other ap-
proaches. In the next subsection we provide a thorough ex-
perimental evaluation of image-agnostic perturbation in the
presence of various defence mechanism. Finally, we end this
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TABLE 7
Comparison of data-free objectives. Fooling rates achieved by
maximizing l2 norm (GD-UAP) vs. mean activation ( [9]) when utilizing
data samples.
Model FFF [9] l2 GD-UAP
CaffeNet 88.35 91.54
VGG-16 72.68 77.77
Resnet-152 65.43 66.68
TABLE 8
Effect of data dependency on crafting the perturbations. Data
dependent objectives [8] suffer significant drop in fooling ability when
arbitrary data samples are utilized for crafting. A→ B denotes that data
A is used to craft perturbations to fool models trained on data B. Note
that fooling rates for our approach are crafted without utilizing any data
samples (denoted with ∗).
Model Places-205→ ILSVRC ILSVRC→ Places-205
Ours UAP [8] Ours UAP [8]
CaffeNet 87.02* 73.09 88.61* 77.21
GoogLenet 71.44* 28.17 83.37* 52.53
section with a discussion on how GD-UAP perturbations
work.
5.1 Comparison with other approaches
5.1.1 Comparison of data-free objective
First, we compare the effectiveness of GD-UAP against the
existing data-free objective proposed in [9]. Specifically, we
compare maximizing the mean versus l2 norm (energy) of
the activations caused by the perturbation δ (or x/d + δ in
case of exploiting the additional priors).
Table 7 shows the comparison of fooling rates obtained
with both the objectives (separately) in the improved opti-
mization setup (3.4). We have chosen 3 representative mod-
els across various generations of models (CaffeNet, VGG
and ResNet) to compare the effectiveness of the proposed
objective. Note that the improved objective consistently
outperforms the previous one by a significant 3.18%. Similar
behaviour is observed for other vision tasks also.
5.1.2 Data dependent vs. Data-free objectives
Now, we demonstrate the necessity of data dependent ob-
jective [8] to have samples from the target distribution only.
That is, methods (such as [8]) that craft perturbations with
fooling objective (i.e. move samples across the classification
boundaries) require samples from only the training data
distribution during the optimization. We show that crafting
with arbitrary data samples leads to significantly inferior
fooling performance.
Table 8 shows the fooling rates of data dependent objec-
tive [8] when non-target data samples are utilized in place
of target samples. Experiment in which we use Places-205
data to craft perturbations for models trained on ILSVRC is
denoted as Places-205 → ILSVRC and vice versa. For both
the setups, a set of 10, 000 training images are used. Note
that, the rates for the proposed method are obtained without
utilizing any data (with range prior) and rates for data-
free scenario can be found in Table 2. Clearly the fooling
rates for UAP [8] suffer significantly, as their perturbations
Fig. 8. Reliance of the data dependent objective UAP [8] on the size of
available training data samples. Note that our approach utilizes no data
samples and achieves competitive fooling performance.
TABLE 9
We present the fooling rate comparison of the existing data dependent
UAP[8] approach and the proposed approach.
Priors Ours UAP[8]
No data 58.62 No convergence
Range Prior 71.44 10.56
Data Prior 83.54 78.5
are strongly tied to the target data. On the other hand, for
the proposed method, since it does not craft via optimizing
a fooling objective, the fooling performance does not de-
crease. Importantly, these experiments show that the data
dependent objectives are not effective when samples from
the target distribution are not available. This is a major
drawback as it is difficult to procure the training data in
practical scenarios.
Additionally, as the data dependent objectives rely on
the available training data, the ability of the crafted pertur-
bations heavily depends on the size of the available training
data. We show that the fooling performance of UAP [8]
significantly decreases as the size of the available samples
decreases. Figure 8 shows the fooling rates obtained by
the perturbations crafted for multiple recognition models
trained on ILSVRC by UAP [8] with varying size of sam-
ples available for optimization. We craft different UAP [8]
perturbations (using the codes provided by the authors)
utilizing only 500, 1, 000, 2, 000, 4, 000 and 10, 000 data sam-
ples and evaluate their ability to fool various models. The
performance of the crafted perturbations decreases drasti-
cally (shown in different shades of blue) as the available
data samples are decreased during the optimization. For
comparison, fooling rates obtained by the proposed data-
free objective is shown in green.
5.1.3 Capacity to expoit minimal priors
An interesting question to ask is whether the data depen-
dant approach UAP [8] can also utilize minimal data priors.
To answer this, we craft perturbations using the algorithm
presented in UAP, with different data priors (including no
data priors). Table 9 presents the comparison of GD-UAP
against UAP [8] with different priors. The numbers are
computed on the ILSVRC validation set for Googlenet. We
observe that the UAP algorithm does not even converge in
the absence of data, failing to create a data-free UAP. When
range prior (Gaussian noise in the data range) is used to
11
craft, the resulting perturbations demonstrate a very low
fooling rate of 10.56 compared to 71.44 of the proposed
method. This is not surprising, as a significant decrease in
the performance of UAP can be observed even due to a
simple mismatch of training and target data (ref Table 8).
Finally, when actual data samples are used for crafting,
UAP [8] achieves 78.5 success rate which is closer to 83.54
of the proposed method.
From these results, we infer that since UAP [8] is a data
dependent method, it requires corresponding data samples
to craft effective perturbations. When noise samples are
presented for optimization, the resulting perturbations fail
to generalize to the actual data samples. In contrast, GD-
UAP solves for an activation objective and exploits the prior
as available.
5.2 Robustness of UAPs Against Defense Mechanisms
While many recent works propose novel approaches to craft
UAPs, the current literature does not contain a thorough
analysis of UAPs in the presence of various defense mech-
anisms. If simple defense techniques could render them
harmless, they may not present severe threat to deploy-
ment of deep models. In this subsection, we investigate
the strength of GD-UAP against various defense techniques.
Particularly, we consider (1) Input Transformation Defenses,
such as Gaussian blurring, Image quilting, etc., (2) Targeted
Defense Against UAPs, such as Perturbation Rectifying Net-
works (PRN) [46] and (3) Defense through robust architectural
design such as scattering networks [47].
We evaluate the performance of UAPs generated from
GD-UAP, as well as data-dependent approach UAP [8]
against various defense mechanisms.
TABLE 10
The fooling rates computed for various UAP algorithms for under
different defenses on GoogLeNet. Acctop1 represents the Top-1
Accuracy on clean images in the presence of defense mechanism.
Model Acctop1
Data-Independant Data-Dependant
PNP PRP PDP UAP [8]
No Defense 69.74 58.62 71.44 83.54 78.5
Input transformation defenses
10-Crop 70.94 46.6 54.3 66.6 -
Gaussian
Smoothing 58.12 25.80 35.62 32.66 32.78
Median
Smoothing 51.78 35.08 46.98 43.96 37.02
Bilateral
Smoothing 60.28 17.06 21.50 22.34 22.74
Bit-Reduction
(3-bit) 63.20 48.66 61.34 72.30 69.62
Bit-Reduction
(2-bit) 45.50 46.74 56.76 60.50 65.40
JPEG (75%) 67.50 35.66 51.22 61.38 42.62
JPEG (50%) 64.16 29.34 41.84 44.62 31.40
TV
Minimization 50.50 27.9 31.9 30.9 26.22
Image
Quilting 51.30 30.76 36.12 34.80 25.84
Targeted Defenses Against UAPs
PRN Defense 68.90 31.34 46.60 52.50 21.35
5.2.1 Input Transformation Defenses
For defense by input transformations, inline with [48]
and [49], we consider the following simple defenses: (1) 10-
Crop Evaluation, (2) Gaussian Blurring, (3) Median Smooth-
ing, (4) Bilateral Filtering (5) JPEG Compression, and (6) Bit-
Depth Reduction. Further, we evaluate two sophisticated
image transformations proposed in [50], namely, (7) TV-
Minimization and (8) Image Quilting (Using code provided
by the authors).
Table 10 presents our experimental evaluation of the
defenses on the Googlenet. As we can see, while the fooling
rate of all UAPs is reduced by the defenses (significantly in
some cases), it is achieved at the cost of model’s accuracy
on clean images. If Image Quilting, or TV-normalization is
used as a defense, it is essential to train the network on
quilted images, without which, a severe drop in accuracy is
observed. However, in majority of the defenses, UAPs flip
labels for more than 45% of the images, which indicates
threat to deployment. Further, as Bilateral Filtering and JPEG
compression show strong defense capability at low cost to
accuracy, we evaluate the performance of our GD-UAP
perturbations (with range prior) on 6 classification networks
in the presence of these two defenses. This is shown in
Table 11. We note that when the defense mechanism signifi-
cantly lowers the fooling rates, a huge price is paid in terms
of % drop in Top-1 Accuracy (DAcc), which is unacceptable.
This further indicates the poor fit of input transformations
as a viable defense.
5.2.2 Targeted Defense Against UAPs
Now, we turn towards defenses which have been specif-
ically engineered for UAPs. We evaluate the performance
of the various UAPs, with the Perturbation Rectifying Net-
work(PRN) [51] as a defense. PRN is trained using multiple
UAPs generated from the algorithm presented in UAP [8] to
rectify perturbed images. In Table 10, we present the fooling
rates obtained on Googlenet using various perturbations,
using the codes provided by the authors of [51]. While PRN
is able to defend against [8], it shows very poor performance
against our data prior perturbation. This is due to the fact
that PRN is trained using UAPs generated from UAP [8]
only, indicating that PRN lacks generalizability to input-
agnostic perturbations generated from other approaches.
Furthermore, it is also observed that various simple in-
put transformation defenses outperform PRN. Hence, while
PRN is an important step towards defenses against UAPs,
in its current form, it provides scarce security against UAPs
from methods it is not trained on.
5.2.3 Defense through robust architectural design
As our optimization process relies on maximizing ||f(x +
δ)||2 by increasing Π||li(x + δ)||2∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...} (where li(.)
represents the input to layer li+1), one defense against our
attack can be to train the network such that the change
in the output to a layer li minimally effects the output of
the network f(.). One method for achieving this target can
be to minimize the Lipschitz Constant Ki of each linear
transformation in the network. As Ki controls the upper
bound of the value of ||f(x + δ) − f(x)||2 with respect to
||li(x + δ) − li(x)||2, minimizing Ki∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...} can lead
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TABLE 11
The effect of strong input defenses on perturbations crafted from our objective with range-prior. DAcc represents the percentage drop in Top-1
Accuracy on clean images.
Model Caffenet VGG-F GoogLeNet VGG-16 VGG-19 ResNet-152
%DAcc FR %DAcc FR %DAcc FR %DAcc FR %DAcc FR %DAcc FR
No Defense - 87.1 - 91.8 - 71.4 - 63.1 - 64.7 - 37.3
JPEG(50%) 5.23% 72.1 0.5% 77.5 8% 41.8 2.6% 49.2 2.4% 64.7 4.7% 37.3
Bilateral 15.2% 34.8 18.2% 34.8 13.5% 21.5 14.7% 35.8 14.2% 28.2 9.7% 25.4
TABLE 12
Fooling Rate for Hybrid-network [47], ResNet-18 and VGG-13 by
black-box attack.
No-Prior Range-Prior Data-Prior
Perturbation from VGG-13
Hybrid-network 28.91 30.96 33.90
ResNet-18 35.08 39.14 43.92
Perturbation from ResNet-18
Hybrid-network 25.30 27.82 39.36
VGG-13 37.82 44.70 60.86
to a stable system where minor variation in input layer
do not translate to high variation in output. This would
translate to low fooling rate when attacked by adversarial
perturbations.
In [52], Bruna et al. introduce scattering network. This
network consist of scattering transform, which linearize the
output deformation with respect to small input deforma-
tion, ensuring that the Lipschitz constant is ≤ 1. In [47],
a hybrid approach was proposed, which uses scattering
transforms in the initial layers, and learn convolutional
layers (Res-blocks, in specific) on the transformed output
of the scattering layers, making scattering transform based
approaches feasible for Imagenet. The proposed Hybrid-
network gave performance comparable to ResNet-18 and
VGG-13 while containing much lesser layers.
We now evaluate the fooling rate that GD-UAP pertur-
bations achieve in the Hybrid-Network, and compare it to
fooling rate achieved on VGG-13 and ResNet-18 networks.
In the Hybrid-network, ideally we would like to maximize
||li(x + δ)||2 at each of the Res-Block output. However, as
∂S(x)/∂x, where S(.) represents the Scattering Transform,
is non-trivial, we only perform black-box attacks on all the
networks.
Table 12 shows the results of the black-box attack on
Hybrid Networks. Though Hybrid networks on an average
decrease the fooling rate by 13% when compared to other
models, they still remain vulnerable.
5.3 Analyzing how GD-UAP works
As demonstrated by our experimentation in section 4, it
is evident that GD-UAP is able to craft highly effective
perturbations for a variety of computer vision tasks. This
highlights an important question about the Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNNs):“How stable are the learned rep-
resentations at each layer?” That is, Are the features learned
by the CNNs robust to small changes in the input? As
Fig. 9. Percentage relative change in the extracted representations
caused by our crafted perturbations at multiple layers of VGG-16.
mentioned earlier ‘fooling’ refers to instability of the CNN
in terms of its output, independent of the task at hand.
We depict this as a stability issue with the learned
representations by CNNs. We attempt to learn the optimal
perturbation in the input space that can cause maximal
change in the output of the network. We achieve this via
learning perturbations that can result in maximal change in
the activations at all the intermediate layers of the architec-
ture. As an example, we consider VGG-16 CNN trained for
object recognition to illustrate the working of our objective.
Figure 9 shows the percentage relative change in the feature
activations (‖li(x+δ)−li(x)‖2×100‖li(x)‖2 ) at various layers in the
architecture. The percentage relative change in the feature
activations due to the addition of the learned perturbation
increases monotonically as we go deeper in the network.
Because of this accumulated perturbation in the projection
of the input, our learned adversaries are able to fool the
CNNs independent of the task at hand. This phenomenon
explains the fooling achieved by our objective. We can also
observe that with the utilization of the data priors, the rel-
ative perturbation further increases which results in better
fooling when the prior information is provided during the
learning.
Our data-free approach, consists of increasing ||li(δ)||
across the layers, to increase f(δ). As Figure 9 shows, this
crafts a perturbation, which leads to an increase in f(x+ δ).
One may intrepret this increase to be caused due to the
locally linear nature of CNNs. i.e., f(x + δ) ≈ f(x) + f(δ).
However, our experiments reveal that the feature extractor f
might not be locally linear. We observe the relation between
the quantities ||f(x+ δ)− f(x)||2 and ||f(δ)||2, where ||.||2
represents the L2-norm, and f(.) represents the output of
the last convolution layer of the network. Figure 10 presents
the comparison of these two quantities for VGG-16 com-
puted during the proposed optimization with no prior.
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TABLE 13
Relative Shift in Classification Layer’s input vs. fooling rate for VGG-16
for object recogntiion. The relative shift has been evaluation on 1000
random images from ILSVRC validation set, while the fooling rate is
evaluated on the entire ILSVRC validation set.
Perturbation Rel. Shift in input to
fc8 (classification) layer
Fooling rate
Baseline 0.0006 8.62
No Prior 0.867 45.47
Range Prior 1.142 63.08
All data Prior 3.169 77.77
From the observations, we infer: (1) ||f(x+ δ)− f(x)||2
is not approximately equal to ||f(δ)||2, and hence, f is not
observed to be locally linear, (2) However, ||f(x+δ)−f(x)||2
is strongly correlated to ||f(δ)||2, and our data-free op-
timization approach exploits this correlation between the
two quantities. To summarize, our data-free optimization
exploits the correlation between the quantities, ||f(x+ δ)−
f(x)||2 and ||f(δ)||2, rather than the local-linearity of feature
extractor f .
Finally, the relative change caused by our perturbations
at the input to classification layer (fc8 or softmax) can
be clearly related to the fooling rates achieved for various
perturbations. Table 13 shows the relative shift in the feature
activations (‖li(x+δ)−li(x)‖2‖li(x)‖2 ) that are input to the classifica-
tion layer and the corresponding fooling rates for various
perturbations. Note that they are highly correlated, which
explains why the proposed objective can fool the CNNs
trained across multiple vision tasks.
Fig. 10. Correlation between ||f(x+δ)−f(x)||2 and ||f(δ)||2 computed
for VGG-16 model. Plot shows the fit between ||f(x + δ) − f(x)||2 and
||f(δ)||2 computed during the training at iterations just before the δ gets
saturated.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel data-free objective
to craft image-agnostic (universal) adversarial perturbations
(UAP). More importantly, we show that the proposed ob-
jective is generalizable not only across multiple CNN ar-
chitectures but also across diverse computer vision tasks.
We demonstrated that our seemingly simple objective of
injecting maximal “adversarial” energy into the learned
representations (subject to the imperceptibility constraint)
is effective to fool both the classification and regression
models. Significant transfer performances achieved by our
crafted perturbations can pose substantial threat to the deep
learned systems in terms of black-box attacking.
Further, we show that our objective can exploit minimal
priors about the target data distribution to craft stronger
perturbations. For example, providing simple information
such as the mean and dynamic range of the images to
the proposed objective would craft significantly stronger
perturbations. Though the proposed objective is data-free
in nature, it can craft stronger perturbations when data is
utilized.
More importantly, we introduced the idea of general-
izable objectives to craft image-agnostic perturbations. It
is already established that the representations learned by
deep models are susceptible. On top of it, the existence
of generic objectives to fool “any” learning based vision
model independent of the underlying task can pose critical
concerns about the model deployment. Therefore, it is an
important research direction to be focused on in order to
build reliable machine learning based systems.
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